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I.

INTRODUCTION

The bicentennial of the Constitution is a most appropriate occasion
to consider the insidious effect that discretionary executive branch power
has on the American democratic process. This Article examines the exercise of that power in the field of international trade. Even when the
President exercises broad discretionary power in the international trade
area pursuant to a broad grant of Congressional authority, a serious affront to representative democracy occurs. Representative democracy
suffers even more when the Executive exercises such power without any
delegation from Congress whatsoever. Such conduct is constitutionally
offensive.
As this Article explores in greater depth, every time the President or
his delegates negotiate a voluntary trade restraint agreement with a foreign trading partner, the executive branch acts without congressional delegation of power and thus engages in an unconstitutional act. Under
these voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs), a foreign government typically agrees to orchestrate a limit on its manufacturers' exports of certain
merchandise to the United States for a fixed time period.' The executive
branch extorts these VRAs 2 -misnamed because they are neither volun1. One of the more recent VRAs concluded by the United States in December 1986
covered machine tools. See Administration Announces Import Restraints, Other Measures to
Aid Machine Tool Industry, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1537 (1986). The five-year agreement
was reached with Japan and Taiwan. Id. Japan agreed to roll back its share of the United
States machine tool market to 1981 levels. U.S., Japan Initial Accord Limiting Tokyo's
Machine Tool Exports Over Next Five Years, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1421 (1986).
2. Two of the most noteworthy VRAs are the agreement with Japan in 1981 to reduce its
export of automobiles to the United States by 7.7%, and the agreement reached in 1969 among
Japan, the European Economic Community, and the United States limiting steel exports to
America. See G.

HUFBAUER,

UNITED STATES:

31

D.

BERLINER

CASE STUDIES

& K. ELLIOTr, TRADE PROTECTION

154, 249-50 (1986).
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tary nor agreements-under threat of more adverse action.'
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Further-

more, the President concludes them without a congressional delegation
of authority to do so. 4 The exercise of that power usually follows on the
heels of an American industry's request for Presidential intervention after the industry has been frustrated in its attempt to obtain trade relief
under the alternative statutory vehicles created by Congress. 5 While the

need for flexibility and discretion in dealing with sensitive international
trade issues is understandable, that need pales in comparison to the importance of preserving representative democracy. IfCongress took its

constitutionally designated role as the chief architect of American foreign trade policy more seriously, a coherent policy might emerge to re-

place the fragmented, ad hoe policy currently in place.
For better or worse, in the field of foreign affairs the President historically has enjoyed wide latitude in dealing with international emergencies and in formulating United States foreign policy. 6 The executive
3. The legal fiction that VRAs are in fact voluntary and unilateral in nature and, therefore, not beyond the President's power either under statute or the Constitution received a
judicial imprimatur in Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir,
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). However, as Judge Leventhal noted in a vigorous
dissent, "These undertakings are bilateral, and establish obligations. Their bite persists
notwithstanding the majority's effort to coat them bland vanilla." 506 F.2d at 146.
4. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), tile
Supreme Court recognized the exclusive power of the President in the field of international
relations. But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). Nevertheless, while the President may be vested with an inherent
foreign affairs power that in some sense is "plenary and exclusive," no such power exists in tile
field of international trade. Under the commerce clause, the Constitution explicitly vests in
Congress, not the President, exclusive power to regulate foreign trade. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cls. 1 & 3;United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953) ("Tile
courts
power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, not in the executive or tile
....
"),aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955); R. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 140 (1983) ("The Court has always. recognized a plenary power in
Congress to deal with matters touching upon ... foreign trade.").
5. Three of the most frequently used trade relief statutes are section 201 of the Trade Act
of 1974, commonly referred to as the "escape clause," 19 U.S.C. §2251 (1982 & Supp. III
1985), as amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98.573, § 249, 98 Stat. 2998.
99 (1984); the antidumping duty law, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673i (1982 & Supp. III 1985); and
the countervailing duty law, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671-1671f (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See
generally Berg, PetitioningandResponding Under the Escape Clause: One Practitioner'sView
on How To Do It, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 407 (1981); Barshefsky & Cunningham, The
Prosecutionof Antidumping Actions Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 307 (1981); deKeiffer, When, Why, and How to Bring a CountervailingDuty
Proceeding: A Complainant'sPerspective, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 363 (1981); Hemmendinger & Barringer, The Defense of Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Investigations
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.427 (1981),
6. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1972); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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branch's foreign affairs power finds its source in article II of the Consti-

tution.7 Article II not only vests the executive power in the President,8
but also empowers the President to make treaties with the concurrence of
two-thirds of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, and to serve as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States.9 In United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., ' the Supreme Court acknowl-

edged the "plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations ..... II

While the President may be vested with an inherent foreign affairs
power that in some sense is "plenary and exclusive,"'

2

no such power

exists in the field of international trade. The Constitution explicitly vests
in Congress, not the President, exclusive power to regulate foreign trade
under the commerce clause.1 3 Congress periodically has deemed it appropriate, however, to delegate to the President certain discretionary
powers to be exercised in furtherance of a legislative scheme enacted by

Congress regulating international trade. This delegation of power by
Congress to the President, though frequently sweeping in scope,

4

is nev-

7. U.S. CONST. art. II.
8. IL § 1.
9. Id §2.
10. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
11. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
12. Id. But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). For a strong criticism of Justice Sutherland's theory of presidential
power in the Curtiss-Wright case, see Levitan, The Foreign Relations Po~tvr.An Analysis of Mr.
Justice Sutherland'sTheory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 3. See United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d
560, 571 (C.C.P.A. 1975). Notwithstanding this textual commitment of the foreign trade
power to Congress, "[it is impossible to extricate the question of distribution of powers over
foreign economic affairs from the general problem of distribution of powers over foreign affairs
in United States governmental and constitutional practice." J. JACKSON & IV.DAvEy, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON
THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 77 (1986). Nevertheless, "even though the conduct of general foreign policy... may

rest largely in the Executive Branch, when it comes to economic foreign policy, Congress does
not hesitate to assert itself." Id at 105. Indeed, in the area of international economic affairs,
Congress holds the trump card of implementing legislation. For while the executive branch
may enter into negotiations with foreign trading partners without congressional authorization,
or even in excess of such authorization, as a practical matter commitments may be made that
will never come into effect because Congress will not enact the necessary implementing legislation. Id at 78. For a discussion of the exclusive nature of Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce, see United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953). aff'd
on othergrounds, 348 U.S 296 (1955), in which the Fourth Circuit noted, "[W]hile the President has certain inherent powers under the Constitution..., the power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce is not among the powers incident to the Presidential office, but is expressly vested by the Constitution in the Congress." 204 F.2d at 659.
14. See, e.g., Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1982 & Supp.
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ertheless subject to the so-called "intelligible principle" test, 5 which obligates Congress to specify "an intelligible principle to which the
[President] is directed to conform." 6 If Congress fails to specify an intelligible principle by which the President is to be guided, vesting discretionary authority in the President represents an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.' 7 In short, under the constitutional sys-

tem, when the President exercises discretionary foreign trade power, he
must do so pursuant to a proper congressional delegation. Regrettably,

when negotiating VRAs, the President acts as a freelancer who lacks any
congressional mandate.

This Article initially describes the discretionary powers of the executive branch under the five most frequently used United States trade
laws. Through these trade laws, 8 Congress has delegated to the President the power to grant and withhold international trade relief. The
President's exercise of this power has often been the source of political
friction both within and without the United States.' 9 Next, the discusIII 1985), as amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 502-508, 98
Stats. 3018-24 (1984); International Emergency Economic Power; Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 17011706 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 US.C. app. §§ 1-6, 7-39, 4144 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Agricultural Act of 1956 § 204, 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982), Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 § 232 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982)). These statutes
are beyond the scope of this Article. For a recent decision interpreting the President's power
under the Generalized System of Preferences, see Florsheim Shoe Co,v. United States, 744
F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984), noted in Note, TradePreferences and LDCs: Less Executive Discretion and More CongressionalDirection: Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 58 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 903 (1984). For a recent decision interpreting the provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). For two
recent decisions interpreting the President's authority under Agricultural Act of 1956 § 204, 7
U.S.C. § 1854 (1982), see American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers-Textile & Apparel
Group v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Mast Indus. v. Regan, 596 F,Supp.
1567 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). For a recent decision dealing with Trade Expansion Act of 1962
§ 232 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982), see Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 1427
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 764 F.2d 837 (1985).
15. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
16. Id. See also Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559
(1976).
17. Hampton & Co., 276 U.S. at 409.
18. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(g), 2253(a), 2411(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985),
19. Two recent examples highlight this friction. The first is the decision of the President to
impose 200% tariffs on certain gourmet food items from the European Economic Community
(EC) in retaliation for the EC's failure to compensate the U.S. for lost grain sales to Spain and
Portugal upon their entry into the EC in early 1986. EC, U.S. NegotiatorsAgree to Meet Again
in Attempt to Forestall Trade Retaliation, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 4 (1987). The second is
the President's decision to impose tariffs on certain Japanese electronics products in retaliation
for Japan's alleged failure to abide by an antidumping settlement agreement involving computer chips. Presidentto Weigh Lifting Third-CountrySemiconductorSanctionsAgainst Japan,
4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1347, 1348 (1987).

1987]

Voluntary Restraint Agreements

sion turns to a consideration of VRAs, the epitome of unfettered executive branch discretion in the field of international trade. Finally, the
Article examines several proposals for modifying trade relief law.
II.

DISCRETIONARY POWER UNDER UNITED STATES
TRADE LEGISLATION

United States laws regulating international trade are a combination
that ranges from largely mechanical statutes20 to those bulging with discretionary power. On the mechanical end of the spectrum are the countervailing and antidumping duty laws, under which the Department of
Commerce has limited discretion in determining, for example, whether a
foreign government has bestowed a counteravailable subsidy upon its
manufacturers or how a dumping margin is to be calculated. If it finds
that either a subsidy exists or sales at less than fair value have occurred,
the Commerce Department must issue an order imposing offsetting
duties.2 1
In the middle of the spectrum falls section 337, the unfair import
practice statute,22 and the section 201 escape clause relief law.23 Under
both these statutes, the International Trade Commission conducts a regularized administrative proceeding. However, at the conclusion of either
proceeding the President may deny trade relief for policy reasons.2" On
the far end of the spectrum is section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,"
under which the President has virtually unfettered discretion to determine whether a foreign trade practice is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or
discriminatory, whether such a practice burdens United States commerce, and, if so, whether any relief should be granted.
The following sections provide a survey of these five trade relief statutes and their discretionary features.
A.

The Countervailing and Antidumping Duty Laws

By far the most widely used and most mechanical of all the trade
relief statutes are the antidumping and countervailing duty laws.2 6 From
20. "Mechanical" describes laws that provide that discretion is narrowly circumscribed
and that relief is mandatory if statutory criteria for relief are met.
21. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e, 1673e (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This assumes, of course, that the
International Trade Commission finds the requisite injury. Id. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b).
22. Id. § 1337.
23. Id. § 2251.
24. Id §§ 2252(a)(1), 1337(g).
25. Id § 2411.
26. Id. §§ 1671-1673i.
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1980 through 1986, well over five hundred antidumping duty and coun27
tervailing duty petitions were filed with the Commerce Department.
Under these two laws an aggrieved domestic manufacturer or producer

may file a petition with the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission. 28 The petition triggers a full-scale administrative investigation conducted within rigid deadlines, 29 the results of which
may ultimately be the subject of judicial review.30
The history of the countervailing duty law is a microcosm of much
of the history of United States trade policy in the twentieth century. The

first countervailing duty law was the Tariff Act of' 1890,31 which was
little more than special interest legislation for the domestic sugar induscountervailing duty law was expanded in 1897 to cover all
try.32 The
imports. 33 Before 1922, the countervailing duty law was limited to subsidies for the exportation of merchandise, 34 and not for the merchandise's
manufacture or production. The Tariff Act of 192231 for the first time
27. Unfair Foreign Trade Practices-Part3: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Overslght
and Investigationsand the Special Subcomm. on U.S.-Pacific Rim Trade of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1986) (testimony of Malcolm Baldrige,
Sec'y of Commerce).
28. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b), 1673a(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
29. Id.§§ 1671b, 1671d, 1673b, 1673d.
30. Id.§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii), & (iii); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1932). Judicial review helps
insure, inter alia, that the administrative agencies have not compromised their processes because of political considerations.
31. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567. See deKeiffer, supra note 5, at 364.
32. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567, 583-85. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States, 437 U.S. 443, 451 (1978); Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 41 (1919);
Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496, 502 (1903); ASG Indus. v. United States, 467 F. Supp.
1200, 1208 n.l (Cust. Ct. 1979).
The economic theory behind the countervailing duty law was that Congress could set
tariffs at a level judged to be sufficient to provide the desired effect to targeted industries,
Foreign subsidies thus had to be checked because they were seen as an attempt to breach the
tariff wall erected by Congress. In essence, the offending foreign subsidies effectively cancelled
the tariff protection accorded the American sugar producers. Therefore, countervailing duties
were designed to offset the exact amount of the foreign subsidy and thereby maintain the
integrity of the tariff protection. Because the amount of the tariff was assumed to be necessary
to provide the desired protection, any subsidized import was presumed to cause injury to the
competing American industry. Prior to passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, no
injury test was required. By the same token, Congress deemed merchandise entering the
United States duty-free not to be in competition with comparable merchandise produced by
United States competitors. Accordingly, since American producers needed no tariff protection, they did not require protection through the countervailing duty law. However, with the
Trade Act of 1974, the countervailing duty law was extended to nondutiable merchandise.
33. Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205.
34. Id.See ASG Indus. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200, 1208 (Cust. Ct. 1979)
("[T]he first countervailing duty law of general application was enacted as section 5 of the
Tariff Act of 1897 ...[footnote omitted].").
35. 42 Stat. 858.
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imposed countervailing duties on the manufacture and production of
merchandise as well.3 6
From 1922 to 1974 the Department of the Treasury-the agency

then responsible for administering the countervailing duty law-consistently countervailed export subsidies,3 7 most often governing the form of
bounties awarded to exporters.3 8 In 1923 the Treasury Department imposed the first countervailing duty on steel products from Australia to
offset a domestic subsidy.3 9 Although no intent to increase exports of
steel products by Australia was apparent, the Treasury Department
nonetheless countervailed the production subsidy.'

The end of World War II marked a dramatic shift in United States
international trade policy from one of protectionism-the highwater
mark of which being the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Aet4 t-to one of
trade liberalism.42 This shift was initiated by the Truman administration's strong support for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),4 3 and was also reflected in the Treasury Department's adminis-

tration of the countervailing duty law. Administrative delay in handling
countervailing duty cases was the primary instrument by which this pol36. Id. at 935-36. Countervailing duties were also imposed on subsidies given by a "person, partnership, cartel, or corporation," not just by governments. Id.
37. The term "export subsidy" is defined as "a subsidy conditioned on export of the product or on export performance." Barcel6, Subsidies, CountervailingDuties and Antidumping
After the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257,261 (1980). See also J. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 365-99 (1969); Low, A Definition of "Export Subsidies" in
GA TI, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 375 (1982). A "domestic subsidy" (sometimes referred to as a
"production subsidy") is one "granted without respect to output destination." Barcel6, supra,
at 261.
38. See Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidie; Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the CountervailingDuty Law, 1 LAw & POL'Y ININT'L Bus.
17 (1969) (author identifies a host of export subsidies-direct subsidy payments, excessive tax
rebates, preferred income tax treatment, government price support systems, export loss indemnification, subsidies for specific production and distribution costs, currency manipulation
plans, and rax remissions-that were countervailed during the period from 1922 to 1974).
39. T.D. 39,722, 44 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 8 (1923). See T.D. 40,001, 45 Treas. Dec. Int.
Rev. 129 (1924).
40. Id. See ASG Indus. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200, 1211-13 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
41. Tariff Act of 1930 § 303, 46 Stat. 687.
42. See J. JACKSON, supra note 37, at 35-38.

43. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948). See J. JACKSON, supra note 37, at 39-42; Jackson, Louis &
Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing InternationalEconomic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REv. 267, 344-45 & n.180 (1982); Jackson, The GeneralAgreement
on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Low, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 268, 281-92
(1967). GATI was accepted under authority granted the President by the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1366 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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icy was achieved,' since prior to 1974 no statutory deadlines existed for
disposing of countervailing duty petitions filed by adversely affected domestic industries.4" The Treasury Department allowed dust to gather on

those petitions.46 Moreover, in 1964 the Treasury's position was that it
would not countervail a domestic subsidy absent an export-stimulating
effect.4 7

The Trade Act of 197448 dramatically altered this situation. That
act imposed specific time limits on administrative determinations 49 and
for the first time made judicial review available to domestic manufacturers." In light of these new statutory provisions, the Treasury no longer
had unrestrained discretion to sidestep and delay difficult and politically
sensitive countervailing decisions.5 I The countervailing duty law was

again substantially overhauled in 1979 with passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.52 While the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 does not

provide a bright-line definition of the term "subsidy," it does set out illus44. See Comment, United States Countervailing Duty Law: Renewed, Revamped and
Revisted-Trade Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 832, 841-42 (1976),
45. Id.
46. In addition, before 1967 the Treasury was not required to give public notice of an
investigation. See, e.g., Customs Duties, Countervailing Duties; Bounty or Grant Paid or Bestowed, 32 Fed. Reg. 13,276 (1967). Also, prior to 1974 only affirmative determinations were
required to be published. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 183.85 (1974); Jackson, Louis
& Matsushita, supra note 43, at 355-58.
47. See Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Hendrick to the
files (May 28, 1964), quoted in ASG Indus. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200, 1218 (Cust.
Ct. 1979). See also X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, Custom Duties, 38 Fed, Reg,
1018, T.D. 73-10 (1973).
48. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a), (d), (e) (1982).
50. Id. Compare United States v. Hammond Lead Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
51. Nevertheless, even after passage of the Trade Act of 1974, the Treasury still held fast
to its export promotion theory in the case of domestic subsidies. See, e.g., Float Glass from
France, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,499 (1975); Float Glass from the United Kingdom, 40 Fed, Reg,
29,499 (1975); Float Glass from West Germany, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,499 (1975); Float Glass from
Belgium, 41 Fed. Reg. 1299-1300 (1976); Float Glass from Italy, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,016 (1977),
These decisions eventually reached the courts; in each instance the Treasury's determinations
were reversed. See ASG Indus. v. United States, 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.P.A. 1979); ASG Indus. v.
United States, 610 F.2d 785 (C.C.P.A. 1979); ASG Indus. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200
(Cust. Ct. 1979).
52. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979). Coincidentally with enactment of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, responsibility for the administration of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws was transferred from the Treasury to the Commerce Department, Reorg,
Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed, Reg, 989
(1980).
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trative lists of what constitute export and domestic subsidies"3 that may
be expanded administratively, "consistent with the basic definition"' of
a subsidy. In effect, executive branch discretion under the countervailing
duty law, already narrowly circumscribed, was reined in even tighter.

As with the countervailing duty law, the history of the antidumping
duty law also provides an excellent case study of the struggle between
Congress and the President over United States foreign trade policy. The
first antidumping law was the Antidumping Act of 1916.11 That Act

only prohibited predatory dumping, that is, dumping that threatened
monopolization of the United States market,5 6 and was enforced only
through private lawsuits. A second, parallel dumping statute enacted in
192117 vested the Treasury Department with sole responsibility for its
53. Tariff Act of 1930 § 771(5), as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5) (1982). That section provides the following definition of "subsidy":
The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term "bounty" or "grant" as
that term is used in section 1303 of this title [19 U.S.C. § 1303], and includes, but is
not limited to, the following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement [the GATT
Subsidies Code] (relating to illustrative list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government
action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries,
whether publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of any class or kind of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained
by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or
distribution.
The reference to Annex A is to the Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of
articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, Basic
Instruments 56 (26th Supp. 1980), commonly known as the "Subsidies Code." The detailed
illustrative list at the Annex to the Subsidies Code identifies as prohibited export subsidies the
provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm contingent upon export performance,
and currency retention schemes that involve a bonus on exports. Id.
54. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 84-85 (1979). For a discussion of the principal
Court of International Trade decisions addressing this question, see Kennedy, An Examination
of Domestic Subsidies and the Standardfor Imposing CountervilingDuties, 9 LOY. LA. INt'L
& COMP. L.J. 1 (1986).
55. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, tit. VIII, 39 Stat. 798 (1916) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 71-77 (1982)).
56. See Barcel6, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The United States and the InternationalAntidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 499 (1972); Note, TechnicalAnalysis of the Antidumping Agreement and the Trade Agreements Act. 11 LAW & POL'Y IN INt'L
Bus. 1405, 1406 (1979).
57. Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-171 (1982)).

[VCol. I11
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administration.

8

In the wake of a legislative-executive branch imbroglio

over the effect of the 1967 International Antidumping Code on the 1921
Antidumping Act,5 9 Congress passed the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
repealing the 1921 Act." In this Act, Congress limited executive branch
discretion under the 1979 revisions to the antidumping duty law in several important respects, and introduced a material injury test that had to
be met before dumping duties could be assessed. 61 In addition to accelerating the time for reaching administrative determinations,

62

Congress

only allowed antidumping duties to be assessed in the amount by which
the foreign market value of imported merchandise exceeded the United
States price for that merchandise. 63 "Foreign market value" is narrowly
defined as the home market price for the merchandise under investigation or, in the absence of home market sales, the price of that merchandise when sold in third countries.' If the Commerce Department
determines that merchandise is being sold at less than fair value, and if
the International Trade Commission (ITC or Commission) in turn finds
that a domestic industry is being materially injured by reason of those
imports, then a duty equal to the margin of dumping must be imposed on
such merchandise.65

The administrative procedures under the countervailing and antidumping duty laws are in all material respects identical.66 In both
58. Id. § 201.
59. As noted in Note, supra note 56:
Congress took umbrage at being excluded from the process of formulation of
U.S. trade policy when the problem (at its conception) was essentially a matter of the
domestic economic effects of "unfair trade practices." Accordingly, the Senate Finance Committee concluded that the Executive branch, acting without the Congress,
lacked constitutional authority to alter the Antidumping Act of 1921.
Id. at 1414-15 (footnotes omitted).
60. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 144, 193 (1979).
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
62. 21d. §§ 1673b(b)-(c), 1673d(a).
63. Id. § 1673. Foreign producers and manufacturers are prohibited from selling their
merchandise in the United States at a price below their home market price. See 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1673-1673a (1986). In essence, the antidumping duty law prohibits price discrimination
within national markets. See Barshefsky & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 308, 318-30. In the
words of the statute, imports may not be sold in the U.S. at a price that is "less than its fair
value." 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Although "fair value" is not defined in tile
Trade Agreements Act itself, Congress intended the concept of fair value to be an estimate of
foreign market value. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 59 (1979).
64. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
65. Id. §§ 1673d(c)(2), 1673e(a).
66. One major difference between the two proceedings is the absence of an injury test in
countervailing duty cases involving a country that has not signed the GATT Subsidies Code or
entered into an equivalent commitment with the U.S. See Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
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countervailing duty and antidumping duty cases a petition is generally
filed with the Commerce Department and the ITC by an aggrieved
American manufacturer on behalf of an industry. Each agency in turn
conducts an investigation in which the Commerce Department makes
preliminary and final determinations of whether there has been dumping
or subsidization. The Commission makes the same determinations for
industry injury.6 7 If final affirmative determinations are reached by both
agencies, an antidumping or countervailing duty order must be issued.
The offending imports are then assessed an offsetting duty equal to the
margin of dumping or the amount of the subsidy. From that determina68
tion an appeal may be taken to the Court of International Trade.
Despite the absence of discretionary executive branch power within
the United States antidumping and countervailing duty laws, the Commerce Department may still administratively settle these cases,6 9 thereby
bypassing the regularized administrative process. However, a case must
meet specific criteria before an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation may be suspended.7 0 In the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 Congress amended the termination provisions of the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws by directing the Commerce Department to consider specific public interest factors 7 I and to consult with the potentially
affected consumer, industry, and worker groups72 before suspending an
antidumping or countervailing duty investigation., Moreover, even if it
suspends an investigation, the Commerce Department is obligated to
monitor compliance with the agreement to insure not only that dumping
or unlawful subsidization is eliminated, but also that once eliminated
these trade practices are not resumed. 3
Suspension agreements are difficult to obtain74 and are becoming an
increasingly rare occurrence, especially in antidumping duty cases." The
(relating to Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), reprintedin H.R. Do. No. 96-153, part
I, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 257 (1979); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303(a)(2), 1671 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
67. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1671d, 1673b, 1673d (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
68. Id § 1516a. Review is on the administrative record using the substantial evidence
test. Id § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii) & (iii).
69. Id §§ 1671c, 1673c.
70. Id §§ 1671c(b), 1671c(d), 1673c(b), 1673c(d).
71. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 604, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 48 (1984) (codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(a)(2)(B), 1663c(a)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
72. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(a)(2)(C), 1673c(a)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
73. It In addition, penalties may be imposed for intentional violations of a suspension
agreement. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(i), 1673c(i) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
74. Hemmendinger & Barringer, supra note 5, at 440.
75. See Holmer & Bello, U.S. Import Law and Policy Serier Suspension and Settlement
Agreements in Unfair Trade Cases, 18 IN'L LAw. 683 (1984).
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Commerce Department clearly views them as the exception rather than
the rule. 6 In fact, in the first four years of the Commerce Department's
administration of the countervailing and antidumping duty laws, suspension agreements were concluded in only twenty-four countervailing duty
investigations and in four antidumping duty cases. 7" Through all of 1986,
the Commerce Department concluded only one antidumping duty 78 and
one countervailing duty7 9 suspension agreement.
Compared to the limited role executive discretion plays in the administration of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, the role of
executive branch discretion in the three other major United States trade
relief laws is considerable. As with the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws, section 201 escape clause relief,80 section 337 patent and
trademark infringement relief,8 1 and section 301 unfair trade practice relief82 are ostensibly rule-based in the sense that each contain statutory

criteria that must be met before relief will be granted. However, unlike
the antidumping duty and countervailing duty laws, these three other
statutes feature significant discretionary powers that, in the case of sec-

tion 201 and section 337 relief, permit the President to deny relief to a
petitioning United States industry despite the recommendation of the

ITC to the contrary. In the case of section 301 relief, -the President's
discretion is virtually unfettered under both the substantive violation and
relief provisions of that law.
76. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1979). The legislative history of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 shows that Congress intended suspension agreements to be the exception rather than the rule:
The suspension provision is intended to permit rapid and pragmatic resolutions
of countervailing duty cases. However, suspension is an unusual action which should
not become the normal means of disposing of cases. The Committee intends that
investigations be suspended only when that action serves the interests of the public
and the domestic industry affected. For this reason, the authority to suspend investigations is narrowly circumscribed.
Id.
77. See Holmer and Bello, supra note 75, at 694-97. A large share of the countervailing
duty suspension agreements stemmed from a flood of countervailin; duty petitions filed by the
U.S. steel industry in 1982.
78. See U.S., Japan Reach Five-Year Deal on Chips, Administration Dropping Dumping,
§ 301 Cases, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 994 (1986).
79. See Investigation of Canadian Red Raspberries Terminated on Basis of Suspension
Agreement, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 92 (1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 1005 (1986).
80. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
81. Id. § 1337.
82. Id. § 2411.
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Section 337 Unfair Import Practices

In the arsenal of trade laws available to American manufacturers to
protect them from the ravages of foreign imports, one of the most potent
and frequently used8 3 is section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193021 With
passage of the Trade Act of 1974, the ITC for the first time was empowered to determine whether certain conduct constituted a violation of section 337, a power previously reserved to the President.85 Under section
337, the Commission is directed to conduct investigations involving alleged unfair import practices8 6 and is authorized to exclude offending
articles from entry into the United States. 7
83. The ITC has concluded over 235 section 337 cases. See Certain Miniature Hacksaws,
USITC Pub. 1948, Inv. No. 337-TA-237 (Jan. 1987).
84. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Section 337 is a virtual replication of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982). It had its genesis in 1922 when
Congress enacted the predecessor to section 337, section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356,
§ 316, 42 Stat. 943 (1922). Section 316 was reenacted with few changes as section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930.
Section 337 makes illegal "unfair methods of competition or unfair acts" in the importation of merchandise into the United States, language virtually identical with section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition ... and
unfair... acts or practices in or affecting commerce." Despite this identity of language, however, the approaches of the ITC and the Federal Trade Commission in administering their
respective statutory mandates have varied considerably. For a discussion of the different approaches of the two agencies, see Fischbach, The Need to Improve Consistency in the Application and Interpretation of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 65 (1978); Brown, Unfair Mfethods of
Competition in Importation: The Expanded Role of the U.S. InternationalTrade Commission
Under § 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, as Amended by the Trade Act of 1974, 31 Bus. LAW.
1627 (1976); LaRue, Section 337 of the 1930 TariffAct and Its Section 5 FTCAct Counterpart,
43 ANTrTRusr L.. 608 (1974).
85. The President may still disapprove an ITC determination under section 337 "for policy reasons." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a). See Note, The Revitalization ofSection 337 ofthe TariffAct
of 1930 under the Trade Act of 1974, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 167 (1976).
86. Section 337(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982), declares unlawful the importation of articles into the United States that have the effect or tendency "to destroy or substantially injure
an industry... in the United States." Section 337(c) directs the ITC to conduct an investigation into allegations of a section 337(a) violation. Excluded from the scope of section 337 are
antidumping and countervailing duty cases. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (1982). See Brandt &
Zeitler, Unfair Import Trade PracticeJurisdiction: The Applicability of Section 337 and the
CountervailingDuty andAntidumping Laws, 12 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 95 (1980); Kaye
& Plaia, The Relationship of CountervailingDuty and Antidumping Law to Section 337 Jurisdiction of the U.S. InternationalTrade Commission, 2 INT'L TRADE LJ. 3 (1977).
87. If a violation is found to exist, the Commission is authorized to exclude offending
articles from entry into the United States under section 337(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1982), as
well as issue cease and desist orders under section 337(f), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1982).
A section 337 violation typically involves the importation of an article that infringes the
patent rights of a U.S. patent holder, causing injury to an American manufacturer. See. e.g.,
Block v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Massachusetts
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The elements of a section 337 violation are twofold: (1) the peti-

tioner must prove the existence of unfair methods of competition or unfair acts that (2) tend to injure or destroy a domestic industry."8 Included
under the rubric "unfair acts" are patent infringement, 9 trademark and
92
9t
trade secrets misappropriation,9" and palming off, among others.
Remedies for a violation of section 337 include temporary exclusion or9
ders, 93 permanent exclusion orders,94 and cease and desist orders. $
Proceedings before the Commission follow the procedures generally
applicable in federal district courts.9 6 An investigation is commenced by
Inst. of Technology v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Merck & Co. v. United
States. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 774 F.2d 483 (Fed. Cir. 1985); American Hosp. Supply Corp. v.
Travenol Laboratories, 745 F.2d 1 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Certain Thermometer Sheath Packages,
USITC Pub. 992, Inv. No. 337-TA-56, (1979); Certain Solder Removal Wicks, USITC Pub,
823, Inv. No. 337-TA-26, (1977). See also S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7211. Section 337 complaints lodged
with the ITC have also alleged trademark infringement. See Union Mfg. Co. v. Van Back
Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1985); New England Butt Co. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 756 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See generally Ablondi & Vent, Section 337 Import Investiga.
tions-UnfairImport Practices, 4 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27 (1981). False designation
of goods, the passing off of goods, see, e.g., Certain Trolley Wheel Assemblies, USITC Pub.
1605, Inv. No. 337-TA-161 (1984); Pump Top Insulated Containers, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,824
(1979), and the misappropriation of trade secrets, see, e.g., Certain Compound Action Metal
Cutting Snips and Components Thereat, Inv. No. 337-TA-197 (1985); Certain Apparatus for
the Continuous Production of Copper Rod, USITC Pub. 1017, Inv. No. 337-TA-52, 44 Fed.
Reg. 69,041 (1979), have also been the subject of section 337 proceedings.
88. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982). For a discussion of section 337 injury standards, see Easton & Neely, Unfair Competition in U.S. Import Trade: Developments Since the Trade Act of
1974, 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. 203, 212-17 (1980). See also Bally/Midway Mfg. Co. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 714 F.2d 1117, 1124-25 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Ablondi & Vent, supra
note 87; Palmeter, The U.S. InternationalTrade Commission at Common Law, 18 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 497 (1984).
89. Lightweight Luggage, USITC Pub. 463, Inv. No. 337-28 (1972).
90. Certain Apparatus for the Continuous Production of Copper Rod, USITC Pub, 1017,
Inv. No. 337-TA-52 (1979) (trade secrets); Reclosable Plastic Bags, USITC Pub. 801, Inv. No.
337-TA-22 (1977) (trademark).
91. Certain Novelty Glasses, USITC Pub. 991, Inv. No. 337-TA-55 (1979).
92. See supra note 87. For other examples of unfair trade practices found to be within the
scope of section 337, see Kaye & Plaia, The Filing and Defending of Section 337 Actions, 6
N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 463, 467 (1981); Ablondi & Vent, supra note 87, at 37.38,
93. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1982).
94. Id. § 1337(d).
95. Id. § 1337(f)(i). For a discussion of the Commission's enforcement ofsection 337, see
generally Minchew & Webster, Regulating Unfair Practicesin InternationalTrade: The Role
of the United States InternationalTrade Commission, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 27 (1978);
Note, Section 337 An Activist IIC, 14 LAW & POL'Y ININT'L Bus. 981 (1982); Note, Scope of
Action Against -UnfairImport Trade Practices Under Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1920, 4
Nw. J. INT' L. & Bus. 234 (1982).
96. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 218.20 et seq. (1985).
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the filing of a complaint with the Commission.97 All of the traditional
discovery devices are available.98 Protective orders may issue restricting
distribution of confidential business and technical information.99 The
° pursuant to the AdminCommission conducts hearings on the record'O
101
istrative Procedures Act.
The evidentiary hearings are presided over
by an administrative law judge10 2 who makes a recommendation with
regard to the existence vel non of a violation and transmits it to the Commission. The Commission itself determines whether a violation of sec-

tion 337 has occurred. 103 If the Commission determines that a section
337 violation does exist, it must transmit a copy of its determination to

the President,"° who then has sixty days to disapprove that determination "for policy reasons." 10'5 Although the statute does not define "policy reasons,"' 1 6 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated
that "policy reasons"
determination.

10 7

do not include the merits of the ITC's

Of the more than two hundred section 337 investigations that have
been initiated by the ITC since enactment of the Trade Act of 1974,101

the President has disapproved the Commission's final affirmative determination in only four cases.10 9 In the most recent section 337 determina97. Id. § 210.20 (1985). The complaint must, however, satisfy more than the bare notice
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
98. These include depositions, id § 210.31; interrogatories, id. § 210.32; requests for production of documents, id. § 210.33; and requests for admissions, id. § 210.34. The scope of
discovery follows that of Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.
§ 210.30(b).
99. Id. § 210.30(d).
100. Id. § 210.41.
101. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. 111 1985).
102. The administrative law judge allows the presentation of evidence in much the same
manner as a federal district court judge. 19 C.F.R. § 210.41(d).
103. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. III 1985).
104. Id § 1337(g)(i).
105. Id. § 1337(g)(2).
106. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7186, 7331-32; H.R. RE'. No. 1644, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1974),
reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7367, 7391.
107. Young Engineers, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1313
(Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The President may disapprove only 'for policy reasons,' not because of the
merits of an investigation.").
108. Ablondi & McCarthy, Impact of the UnitedStates InternationalTrade Commission on
Commercial Transactions,3 DICK. J.INT'L L. 163, 174 (1985). Through January 1986, 239
investigations have been instituted under section 337. See Certain Non-Contact Laser Precision Dimensional Measuring Devices and Components Thereof, Inv.No. 337-TA-239, 51 Fed.
Reg. 3861 (1986). Only three of the over 50 contested section 337 investigations have resulted
in an ITC finding of "no violation." 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 275 (1986).
109. The most recent of the ITC determinations affected is Certain Alkaline Batteries, Inv.
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tion disapproved by the President, Certain Alkaline Batteries, 10 the
Commission determined that the importation of certain "gray market"
alkaline batteries was a violation of section 337.111 In order to insure a
coherent policy in the area of gray market goods, the President rejected
the Commission's determination for the following reasons:
The Commission's interpretation of section 42 of the Lanham Act
(15 U.S.C. 1124), one of several grounds for the Commission's determination, is at odds with the longstanding regulatory interpretation by
the Department of the Treasury, which is responsible for administering
the provisions of that section. The Administration has advanced the
Treasury Department's interpretation in a number of pending court
cases. Recent decisions of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of International Trade explicitly uphold the Treasury Department's interpretation. Allowing the
Commission's determination in this case to stand could be viewed as
an alteration of that interpretation. I, therefore,
have decided to disap1 12
prove the Commission's determination.
Stating that the disapproval was for policy reasons,"' President
Reagan went on to note:
No. 337-TA-165 (1984), reprintedin 6 Int'l Trade Reg. Dec. (BNA) 1849 (1984). The President's disapproval was issued on January 4, 1985, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2), and was
based upon important policy issues involved in the area of gray market goods. Determination
of the President Regarding Certain Alkaline Batteries, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,655 (1985). That disapproval was unsuccessfully challenged in Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The other three determinations that were disapproved by the President are Certain
Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods for Their Installation, USITC Pub. 1246, Inv.
No. 337-TA-99 (1982) (challenged in Young Engineers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1305); Certain
Headboxes and Papermaking Machinery Forming Sections for the Continuous Production of
Paper, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-82 (1981); Certain Welded Stainless Steel
Pipe and Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978).
110. USITC Pub. 1616, Inv. No. 337-TA-165, Certain Alkaline Batteries; Issuance of Exclusion Order, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,275 (1984).
111. Id. The Commission determined that certain imported alkaline batteries infringed a
registered United States trademark and misappropriated the trade dress of the batteries on
which the trademark was used. Id. See Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1579-80; Determination of the
President Regarding Certain Alkaline Batteries, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,655 (1985). For two recent
decisions discussing the problem of gray market goods, see Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761
F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 642 (1986). See also Kennedy, JurisdictionalConflicts in Grey Market Goods Litigation:
The Failureof the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 9 Hous. J. INT'L L. (1986).
112. Disapproval of the Determination of the United States International Trade Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-165, Determination of the President Regarding Certain Alkaline Batteries, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,655 (1985).
113. Id.
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The Departments of Treasury and Commerce, on behalf of the
Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade, have solicited data from the
public concerning the issue of parallel market importation and are reviewing responses with a view toward formulating a cohesive policy in
this area. Failure to disapprove the Commission's determination could
be viewed as1 a14change in the current policy prior to the completion of
this process.
In a court challenge to the President's disapproval, Duracell, Inc.,
the American trademark holder, argued that the President's disapproval
was for "legal reasons," not "policy reasons," 115 contrary to the statutory authorization under section 337(g)(2). 16 In one of only two reported opinions to consider the question of judicial review of presidential
disapprovals under section 337(g)(2),117 Duracell,Inc v. United States

InternationalTrade Commission, 1 8 the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of the President under 337(g)(2)' 9 disapproving an ITC unfair trade practice determination. 12 0 As an alternative basis for its decision, the Federal Circuit
further ruled that because the President had acted in full compliance
with the provisions of section 337(g)(2), his decision was immune from
further judicial inquiry. 121 The Federal Circuit disagreed with Duracell's
characterization of the reasons given by the President for his disapproval,
observing:
114. I-dSee generally Note, The Greying of American Trademarks: The Genuine Goods
Exclusion Act and the Incongruityof Customs Regulation 19 CF?. § 133.21, 54 FORDHAM L.
REv. 83 (1985); Note, ParallelImportation-LegitimateGoods or Trademark Infringement?,
18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 543 (1985); Note, Vivitar Corp. v. United States and Osawa &
Co. v. B & H Photo: The Issue of Common Control in the ParallelImportation of Trademarked Goods, 17 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 177 (1985).

115. Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578, 1580-81 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
116. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982).
117. Id,§ 1337(g)(2). The other opinion to consider this issue was Young Engineers, Inc.
v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Commission's
determinations are subject to judicial review, see 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. III 1985), but the
President's disapproval decisions are not.
118. 778 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
119. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982). That section provides in part:
If, before the close of the 60-day period beginning on the day after the day on which
he receives a copy of such [ITC] determination, the President, for policy reasons,
disapproves such determination and notifies the Commission of his disapproval, then,
effective on the date of such notice, such determination and the action taken under
subsection (d), (e), or (f) [19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (e), or (f)] with respect thereto shall
have no force or effect.
120. Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1580-81.
121. Id. at 1581-82.
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"Policy" is a broad concept which includes, but is not limited to:
impact on United States foreign relations, economic and political...
[and] upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the
United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive
1 22
articles in the United States, and United States consumers.

The Federal Circuit concluded that because the President had acted
in a timely fashion, had stated that he was acting for policy reasons, and
had stated reasons other than the merits of whether there had been a
violation of section 337,123 the court's inquiry was at an end. 124
C. Section 201 Escape Clause Relief

The President's role under section 337 and section 201 is virtually
identical. Under both statutes the President is empowered, in effect, to
reverse or modify the ITC's affirmative determination by denying or

modifying relief. However, unlike under section 337, the President has
exercised this power under section 201 on many more occasions. Section

201 of the Trade Act of 1974,125 commonly referred to as the "escape
clause," provides relief to an American industry suffering or threatened

with serious injury caused by increased imports of competing
merchandise. 126
The unique feature of the escape clause is its focus on fairly traded
imports that cause serious injury to an American industry. An escape
clause petitioner thus is not required to show that imports are being sold

at less than their fair market value, 127 that they are subsidized by a for122. Id. at 1581-82 (footnote omitted), quoting S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 199
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7331.
123. See supra note 107.
124. Duracell,778 F.2d at 1582.
125. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by Trade and Tariff Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 249, 98 Stat. 2998-99 (1984).
126. Id. § 2251(b)(1). The relief available under section 201 includes increased tariffs on
the imported articles causing injury, quotas on the articles, orderly marketing arrangements,
or any combination of these actions. Id. § 2253(a). The duration of such relief can be for up
to five years. Id.
A closely analogous statute dealing with imports from communist countries is section 406
of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982). Section 406 provides for the same type and
duration of relief as are available under section 201, with the exception of trade adjustment
assistance, see 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a)(3) (1982). Relief is available to an American industry if
imports from communist countries of competing articles cause "market disruption ... with
respect to an article produced by a domestic industry." 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (a)(1) (1982). See
Leonard & Foster, The Metamorphosisof the U.S. InternationalTrade Commission Under the
Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 719, 745-47 (1976).
127. See Tariff Act of 1930 § 731, as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
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eign government, 12 or that they infringe upon the rights of an American
patent or trademark holder. 129 In the eleven-year period from 1974
through 1986, the International Trade Commission has concluded sixty
section 201 escape clause investigations."' In that time the Commission
has issued thirty affirmative determinations, three split decisions, and
twenty-seven negative determinations.'
Upon making an affirmative
escape clause determination, the Commission recommends to the President the relief it believes appropriate under the circumstances.132 In addition to increased duties, tariff rate quotas, and quotas, 133 the ITC may
also recommend to the President that trade adjustment assistance be afforded to the affected firm or organization and its workers. 134
Escape clause proceedings involve two steps. First, upon the filing
of a petition with the ITC, the Commission determines whether serious
injury or threat of serious injury exists that is attributable to an increase
in imports of competing merchandise. 35 If these determinations are affirmative, the Commission then recommends to the President the type of
relief it believes necessary to remedy the injury.13 6 In determining
whether to provide import relief, the President is to take into account
128. See Tariff Act of 1930 § 701, as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
129. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
130. See Kennedy, Causation Under the Escape Clause: The Case For Retaining the "Substantial Cause" Standard,3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 185, 193 n.62 (1985) (where the author notes
that 53 section 201 cases have been initiated by the Commission); Steel Fork Arms, USITC
Pub. 1866, Inv. No. TA-201-60 (1986); Apple Juice, USITC Pub. 1861, Inv. No. TA-201-59
(1986); Certain Metal Castings, USITC Pub. 1849, Inv. No. TA-201-58 (1986); Electric Shavers and Parts Thereof, USITC Pub. 1819, Inv. No. TA-201-57 (1986); Wood Shingles and
Shakes, USITC Pub. 1826, Inv. No. TA-201-56 (1986); Nonrubber Footwear, USITC Pub.
1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55 (1985); Potassium Permanganate, USITC Pub. 1682, Inv. No. TA201-54 (1985).
131. See Applebaum, Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, in U.S. TRADE LAV AND
POLICY 195, 212 (PLI 1987).
132. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
133. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1982).
134. See id §§ 2251(d)(1)(B), 2271.
135. See Berg, Petitioningand Responding Under the Escape Clause: One Practitioner's
View on How To Dolt,6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 407,409-12 (1981); Adams & Dirlam,
Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A Case Study ofSection 201 and Its Interpretation by the InternationalTrade Commission, 52 IND. L., 535, 539-40, 554-58 (1977). See also
Leonard & Foster, supra note 126, at 730-49; Note, An Examination of JTC Determinationson
Importr The Basisfor "SubstantialInjury," 6 IN'rL TRADE LJ. 242, 242-44 (1980-1981).
136. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1982). As is true under section 337, the President is empowered to act under section 201 only when the Commission issues an affirmative determination.
See id. § 2252(a). The Commission has four options respecting its relief recommendations. It
may recommend increased duties, a tariff rate quota, a quota, or any combination of the foregoing. Id. § 2251(d). The Commission may also recommend that trade adjustment assistance
be provided. Id.
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several factors,' 3 7 including the following: (1) the probable effectiveness

of import relief as a means to promote adjustment by the industry concerned to import competition,' 38 (2) the effect of import relief on consumers,' 3 9 (3) the effect of import relief on the international economic

interests of the United States, 140 and (4) the economic and social costs
that would be incurred by taxpayers, communities, and workers if import
relief were to be provided.'
The President may accept or reject in
137. Section 202(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, id. § 2252(c), lists the following nine factors
the President is to consider in making his determination whether to provide escape clause
relief:
(1) information and advice from the Secretary of Labor on the extent to which
workers in the industry have applied for, are receiving, or are likely to receive adjustment assistance under part 2 [19 U.S.C. § 2271] or benefits from other manpower
programs;
(2) information and advice from the Secretary of Commerce on the extent to
which firms in the industry have applied for, are receiving, or are likely to receive
adjustment assistance under parts 3 and 4 [19 U.S.C. §§ 2341 and 2371];
(3) the probable effectiveness of import relief as a means to promote adjustment,
the efforts being made or to be implemented by the industry concerned to adjust to
import competition, and other considerations relative to the position of the industry
in the Nation's economy;
(4) the effect of import relief on consumers (including the price and availability
of the imported article and the like or directly competitive article produced in the
United States) and on competition in the domestic markets for such articles;
(5) the effect of import relief on the international economic interests of the
United States;
(6) the impact on United States industries and firms as a consequence of any
possible modification of duties or other import restrictions which may result from
international obligations with respect to compensation;
(7) the geographic concentration of imported products marketed in the United
States;
(8) the extent to which the United States market is the focal point for exports of
such article by reason of restraints on exports of such article to, or on imports of such
article into, third country markets; and
(9) the economic and social costs which would be incurred by taxpayers, communities, and workers, if import relief were or were not provided.
The foregoing list is not exhaustive. See id. § 2252(c).
138. Id. § 2252(c)(3).
139. Id. § 2252(c)(4).
140. Id. § 2252(c)(5).
141. Id. § 2252(c)(9). The following explanation for granting section 201 relief was given
in the Senate Finance Committee Report to the Trade Act of 1974:
The rationale for the "escape clause" has been, and remains, that as barriers to international trade are lowered, some industries and workers inevitably face serious injury, dislocation and perhaps economic extinction. The "escape clause" is aimed at
providing temporary relief for an industry suffering from serious injury, or the threat
thereof, so that the industry will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer international competition.
S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7263.
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whole or in part any of the ITC's relief recommendations, 4 ' as well as
attempt to negotiate orderly marketing arrangements with the countries
or country involved.' 43 The President also has the discretion to reject
relief altogether if he determines that such relief "is not in the national

economic interest of the United States." 1" As a result, the Presidential
relief decision may be highly political.

Of the thirty-three affirmative and split determinations of the Commission, the President has granted some form of import relief in only
twelve cases."14 If he decides to grant import relief, it may last for up to
five years.' 46 The President may reduce or terminate such relief at any
time if it is in the national interest to do so. 4 7

One of the most recent instances in which the President granted an
American industry escape clause relief was in Certain Stainless Steel and

Alloy Tool Steel.'48 The Commission recommended that the President
impose "quantitative restrictions"-the statutory euphemism for quo-

tas.

49

Stating that he had taken into consideration' 50 the nine factors

142. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a), 2253(a) (1982).
143. Id § 2253(a)(4).
144. Id. § 2252(a)(1)(A). In two recent affirmative ITC escape clause determinations,
President Reagan determined not to grant import relief to the copper and steel industries,
respectively, concluding that to do otherwise would be inconsistent with the national economic
interest. See Copper Import Relief Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,609 (1984); Steel Import
Relief Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1984).
145. See Applebaum, supra note 131, at 212, 220. The President granted relief in the following affirmative determinations: Wood Shakes and Shingles, USITC Pub. 1826, Inv. No.
TA-201-56 (1986) (increased tariffs); Specialty Steel, USITC Pub. 1377, Inv. No. TA-201-48
(1983) (increased tariffs, quotas, orderly marketing arrangement); Heavyweight Motorcycles,
USITC Pub. 1342 (1983) (increased tariffs); Mushrooms, USITC Pub. 1089, Inv.No. TA-20143 (1980) (increased tariffs); Nonelectric Cooking Ware, USITC Pub. 1084, Inv.No. TA-20139 (1979) (increased tariffs); Bolts, Nuts and Large Screws of Iron or Steel, USITC Pub. 924,
Inv.No. TA-201-37 (1978) (increased tariffs); Clothespins, USITC Pub. 933, Inv.No. TA 20136 (1978) (quotas); High Carbon Ferrochromium, USITC Pub. 911, Inv. No. TA-201-35
(1978) (increased tariffs); CB Radio Transceivers, USITC Pub. 852, Inv. No. TA-201-29
(1978) (increased tariffs); Television Receivers, Color and Monochrome, Assembled or Not
Assembled, Finished or Not Finished, and Subassemblies Thereof, USITC Pub. 808, Inv.No.
TA-201-19, (1977) (orderly marketing arrangement); Footwear, USITC Pub. 799, Inv. No.
TA-201-18 (1977) (orderly marketing arrangement); Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel,
USITC Pub. 756, Inv. No. TA-201-8 (1976) (quotas and orderly marketing arrangement).
146. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(1) (1982).
147. Id § 2253(h)(4). For an example of early termination by the President of section 201
import relief, see Proclamation No. 4904, 47 Fed. Reg. 8,753 (1982) (prematurely terminating
three-year import relief granted the mushroom industry in 1980 pursuant to Proclamation No.
4801, 45 Fed. Reg. 70,361 (1980)).
148. USITC Pub. 1377, Inv. No. TA-201-48 (1983).
149. See Certain Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, Proclamation No. 5074,48 Fed. Reg.
33,233 (1983), modified at 50 Fed. Reg. 16,382 (1985).
150. Id
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contained in section 202(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, t 11 President Rea-

gan decided to impose additional tariffs as well as quantitative restrictions.' 52

The President also directed the United States Trade

Representative (USTR) to negotiate orderly marketing arrangements
with the affected countries.' 5 3 The Presidential proclamation
offered no
54
decision.1
relief
import
this
of
support
in
rationale
151.

19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1982).

152. Certain Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, Proclamation No. 5074, 48 Fed. Reg,
33,233. In accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 2253(b)(1), President Reagan submitted a report to
Congress explaining why his decision differed from the recommendations of the ITC. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. Three months prior to granting import relief in the Stainless Steel case, President Reagan ordered the imposition of increased duties and a tariff-rate quota following the
Commission's Heavyweight Motorcycles determination. See Certain Heavyweight Motorcycles
Determination, Proclamation No. 5050, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,639 (1913). The ITC had recommended the imposition of additional duties on imports of heavyweight motorcycles over a fiveyear period beginning with a 45% ad valorem duty increase the first year, declining to 10% in
the fifth year. See 48 Fed. Reg. 16,639. President Reagan agreed with the Commission's recommendation, "but with tariff-rate quotas to assure small volume producers which have not
contributed to the threat of injury continued access to the United States market." 48 Fed.
Reg. 16,639. The President further provided a tariff-rate quota for articles from Japan. Id
The provision for tariff-rate quotas is contained at 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(2) (1982). A tariff-rate
quota is a mechanism "whereby a given amount of the product per year may enter at one tariff
rate and all in excess of that amount will enter at a higher rate." J. JACKSON, supra note 37, at
202 (footnote omitted). A tariff-rate quota is subject to the limitation that the rate may not be
more than 50% ad valorem above the then-existing rate. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(d)(2) (1982) provides that quotas shall "permit the importation of a quantity or value of the article which is
not less than the quantity or value of such article imported into the United States during tile
most recent period which the President determines is representative of imports of such article."
In a third case, Mushrooms, USITC Pub. 1089, Inv. No. TA-201-43 (1980), the Commission recommended the imposition of import quotas. See 45 Fed. Reg. 16,639 (1930). In his
decision to grant import relief the President opted for the imposition of increased duties, rejecting the ITC's quota recommendation. Presidential Import Relief Determination on Section 201 Case on Mushrooms, 45 Fed. Reg. 70,361 (1980), terminated by Proclamation No.
4904, 47 Fed. Reg. 8,753 (1982). In addition to granting this form of import relief, tlhe President created a White House task force to assist the mushroom industry in adjusting to import
competition. 45 Fed. Reg. 70,361 (1980). In support of his decision to provide tariff relief
rather than the quota relief recommended by the Commission, the President explained:
Increased tariffs will enable the canning industry to become more profitable.
This improvement in their financial position, which is not expected to have a significant inflationary impact, will enable the industry to implement adjustment programs
which they have pledged to undertake. Tariffs are also preferable in this case because, unlike quotas, they allow the natural market forces to continue to work, thus
providing relatively more incentive to the industry to adjust to foreign competition.
Finally, tariffs are preferred because, unlike quotas, they allow the natural market
forces to continue to work, thus providing relatively more incentive to the industry to
adjust to foreign competition. Finally, tariffs are preferred because of the difficulty of
equitably allocating quotas among countries when there are highly competitive new
suppliers entering a market dominated by traditional suppliers.
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In the most recent presidential section 201 decision denying import
relief, NonrubberFootwearImport Relief Determination," the Commission had instituted its investigation following receipt of a resolution by
the Senate Finance Committee requesting an investigation under section
201(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974.156 The President concluded that pro57
viding import relief would not be in the national economic interest,
citing the following factors:
First, import relief would place a costly and unjustifiable burden
on United States consumers and the United States economy ....
Second, import relief would result in serious damage to United
States trade in two ways. If the ITC global remedy were imposed
United States trade would stand to suffer as much as $2.1 billion in
trade damage either through compensatory tariff reductions or retaliatory actions by foreign suppliers. This would mean a loss of United
States jobs and a reduction in United States exports. United States
trade would also suffer because of the adverse impact import relief
would have on major foreign suppliers, such as Brazil, who are heavily
indebted and highly dependent on footwear exports. Import relief
would lessen the ability of these foreign footwear suppliers to import
goods from the United States and thus cause an additional decline in
United States exports.
Third, I do not believe that providing relief in this case would
promote industry adjustment to increased import competition.... I
believe that the industry has been and is in158the process of successfully
adjusting to increased import competition.
Thus, with a view to the adverse effect import relief would have on
United States export performance and on other sectors of the economy,
President Reagan denied relief to the domestic nonrubber footwear industry. 5 9 It was a politically courageous," 6 but equally contemptuous,
act-contemptuous in that both the petitioner's section 201 rights and
Id. It is difficult to see any pattern emerge from these three affirmative presidential relief
determinations. Each appears to be ad hoc.
155. 50 Fed. Reg. 35,205 (1985).
156. See 50 Fed. Reg. 30,245 (1985). Section 201(b)(l) directs the Commission to
promptly make an investigation upon request of the President or the USTR, or upon receipt of
a resolution of either the House Ways and Means Committee or the Senate Finance
Committee.
157. Nonrubber Footwear Import Relief Determination, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,205 (1985).
158. L
159. In another recent escape clause determination in which the President denied relief to
the domestic industry, Steel Import Relief Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1984), President Reagan once again concluded that import relief would not be in the national economic
interest. He gave the following reasons for his conclusion:
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the Commission's section 201 affirmative determination were so lightly

Id.

1. In responding to this pressing import problem, we must do all we can to
avoid protectionism, to keep our market open to free and fair competition, and to
provide certainty of access for our trading partners....
2. It is not in the national economic interest to take actions which put at risk
thousands of jobs in steel fabricating and other consuming industries or in the other
sectors of the U.S. economy that might be affected by compensation or retailiation
measures to which our trading partners would be entitled.
3. This Administration has already taken many steps to deal with the steel
import problem. In 1982, a comprehensive arrangement restraining steel imports
from the European Community was negotiated. This Administration has also conducted an unprecedented number of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations of steel imports, in most cases resulting in the imposition of duties or a
negotiated settlement....

In an effort to defuse a politically explosive situation, the President noted that he had
decided to establish a government policy for the steel industry to be coordinated and directed
by the USTR. In this case, the President thus set his primary focus on the adverse impact
import relief would have on U.S. industries and firms resulting from GATT compensation to
affected countries. See 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(6) (1982). Under GATT, if escape clause relief is
granted by the U.S. to a domestic industry, other GATT signatory countries are entitled to
compensatory trade concessions if trade concessions made by them to the U.S. are nullified or
impaired as a consequence of escape clause relief. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, arts. XIX, XXIII, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.TS. 194. See J.
JACKSON, supra note 37, at 553-73. Compensation in the form of substantially equivalent
concessions would mean that an American industry that exports its products to foreign countries adversely affected by escape clause relief could likely find itself the target of retaliation by
those foreign countries. Explicit in the second point of the President's determination was the
recognition that if the U.S. elected to restrict fairly traded steel imports, export trade in another unrelated sector of the economy would be adversely affected.
Another occasion when the President denied import relief under section 201 was in the
Commission's Unwrought Copper determination, USITC Pub. 1549, Inv. No. TA-201-52
(1984). A unanimous Commission found that imports of copper were a substantial cause of
serious injury to the domestic copper mining industry. Despite this affirmative determination,
President Reagan was entirely unreceptive to the Commission's recommendation to grant import relief, finding that such relief would not be in the national economic interest. Copper
Import Relief Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,609 (1984). The two supporting reasons he gave
for his conclusion were as follows: (1) the potentially adverse effect import relief would have
on the domestic copper-fabricating industry, resulting in backlash effect on the domestic copper producers; and (2) the adverse effect import relief would have on the export earnings of
foreign copper producers.
Unlike the factors relied upon in the President's Steel Import Relief determination-fac.
tors that largely focused on compensation to and possible retaliation by adversely affected
foreign countries, the factors that figured prominently in the Copper Import Relief determina.
tion were the effects on domestic fabricators of copper products and on the ability of less
developed countries to meet their international debt obligations. This last factor was also one
of the factors cited for denying relief in the Nonrubber Footwear Relief determination.
Not suprisingly, the President's determination was a great disappointment to the American copper industry. See Copper Industry Case History Points Out Problems in Using Statute,
Attorney Says, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 243-45 (1986) That disappointment was registered
through a bill introduced in the Senate shortly after the President's Unwrought Copper determination that would have eliminated the President's discretion to withhold relief under section
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disregarded.161
The escape clause does not provide for judicial review of either the
ITC's or President's determinations. Nevertheless, in Maple Leaf Fish
Co. v. United States,I62 the Federal Circuit considered a challenge to the

scope of relief following an affirmative section 201 escape clause determination.16 3 In upholding the scope of the President's relief determination,

the Federal Circuit stated it would be improper for a court to interfere
absent executive branch action beyond the President's delegated authority, observing that "[tihe President's findings of fact and the motivations

for his action are not subject to review."

'

In short, judicial review

under section 201 is extremely limited.
D.

Section 301 Retaliation Against Unfair Trade Practices
Whiie section 337 affords American manufacturers relief from un-

fair import practices and section 201 protects American industries from
fairly traded but highly injurious foreign import competition, section 301

of the Trade Act of 1974165 is retaliatory in nature. It furnishes Amen201 following an affirmative Commission determination. Copper and Extractive Industries
Fair Competition Act of 1984 § 2524, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). That bill also would have
lowered the level of injury necessary to qualify for escape clause relief.
160. See 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1107 (1985), noting the hostile reception to the President's decision in the Footwear case as follows:
The President's announcement prompted outrage from the industry/labor coalition which brought the original Section 201 (escape clause) petition before the ITC.
Speaking for the Footwear Industries of America, George Langstaff said the decision
to do nothing "is crystal clear evidence of the bankruptcy of this Administration's
international trade policy, and a slap in the face to the U.S. Congress, American
workers, and domestic manufacturers."
IL
161. Comparing these six section 201 cases, one explanation for the different treatment
each petitioner received at the hands of the President can be found in the size of the industry in
question, both domestically and worldwide. The larger the industry, the more likely it is that
relief will be withheld. Although this conclusion may seem counterintuitive, the larger the
industry, the more substantial will be the impact of any relief accorded that industry. Given
that circumstance, the more probable it is that relief will be denied because of the serious
threat such relief will present to other unrelated sectors of the U.S. economy, which may be the
innocent victims of retaliatory action or GATT compensation.
162. 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
163. Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
164. Id. at 89, quoting Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
165. 19 U.S.C. § 2411, as amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-573,
§ 304(a)-(c), (f), 98 Stat. 3002, 3005 (1984). Section 301 was also amended in 1979 pursuant to
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. See Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 295 (1979). For a
discussion of the 1979 amendments to section 301, see Coffield, UsingSection 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974 as a Response to Foreign Government Trade Actions: When, Why, and How, 6
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 381, 385-88 (1981).
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can exporters with a mechanism for redressing foreign import restrictions or trade practices that prevent or restrict sales of their products
either in that country or third country markets.'
Section 301 is the
legal vehicle by which American exporters are able to insure that foreign
markets are not unfairly, unreasonably, or discriminatorily restricted or
closed to them due to the action of a foreign government.' 67 To this end,
the President is granted broad retaliatory authority to respond to such
1 68
unfair foreign trade practices.
Section 301 differs substantially from the four other trade laws previously discussed in several material respects. Most significantly, the
range of discretion given by Congress to the President under section 301
is extremely broad. There are no periodic administrative reviews as
under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws' 69 and no provisions for judicial review of presidential action. Furthermore, the nature
of relief under section 301 is indeterminate. Section 301 reaches not only
trade in goods, as do all the other trade laws, but also trade in services
and in foreign direct investment. 70 Finally, the standard for establishing
injury, that is, whether the foreign trade practice "burdens or restricts
United States commerce,"'17 1 is far less stringent than either the serious
injury standard of the escape clause or the material injury standard of the
countervailing duty and antidumping duty laws.
Section 301 authorizes the President to take "all appropriate and
feasible action within his power":
(A) to enforce the rights of the United States under any trade
agreement; or
(B) to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country
or instrumentality that
(i) is inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens
or restricts United States commerce....
166. See Fisher & Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protectionfor U.S.
Exportersof Goods, Services,and Capital,14 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 569 (1982); Coffield,
supra note 166; Hudec, RetaliationAgainst "Unreasonable"Foreign Trade Practices: The New
Section 301 and GA 7T Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 461 (1975). See also
Echols, Section 301: Access to Foreign Markets from an Agricultural Perspective, 6 INT'L
TRADE L.J. 4 (1980-1981).
167. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1982).
168. Id.
169. See id. § 1675.
170. Id. § 2411(e)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. III 1985).
171. Id. § 241 1(a)(1)(B)(ii).
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Thus, four broad categories of unfair trade practices exist for which
relief may be granted under section 301: those which are "inconsistent
with the provisions of, or otherwise den[y] benefits to the United States
under, any trade agreement"; 172 those which are "unjustifiable"; 1 73 those
1 75
which are "unreasonable"; 7 4 and those which are "discriminatory."

In addition to showing that one of these four types of practices has occurred, a petitioner must also establish injury, that is, that the practice in
question "burdens or restricts United States commerce,"76 in the case of
1
unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory practices.
The President may act on his own motion 177 or when petitioned.1 78
Unless an investigation is self-initiated by the USTR, 179 or unless the
172. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i).
173. Iad § 241 1(a)(1)(B)(ii). The statute defines "unjustifiable" practices as "any act, pol-

icy, or practice which is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of
the United States." Id. § 2411(e)(4)(A). Illustrative are practices that deny most-favored-nation treatment to the U.S. or that fail to protect intellectual property rights. Id.
§ 2411(e)(4)(B).
174. Id § 2411(a)(1)(4)(B)(ii). The statute defines an "unreasonable" practice as one
deemed to be "unfair and inequitable," although not necessarily in violation of the interna-

tional legal rights of the United States. Id § 2411(e)(3). Illustrative arc practices that deny
"fair and equitable market opportunities" or "opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise. Id. § 2411(e)(3)(A)-(B).
175. Id § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii). Discriminatory practices are defined to include practices
which deny "national or most-favored-nation treatment to United States goods, services, or
investment." Id § 241 1(e)(5). The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 expanded section 301 to
include foreign direct investment as a protected area of trade. See Pub. L. No. 98-573,
§ 304(f)(1), 98 Stat. 3005 (1984).
176. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)ii) (Supp. III 1985).
177. Id at § 241 1(d)(1).
178. Id at §§ 2411(d)(2), 2412(a). Regulations governing the procedures for filing and
processing section 301 complaints are contained at 15 C.F.R. §§ 2006.0-2006.15 (1985).
179. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(c) (Supp. III 1985). In the Il-year period from 1975 through
1985, 50 section 301 petitions were filed with the USTL 2 [Reference File] Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1414-22 (1985) (listing § 301 cases filed through June 14, 1985); Determination Not to
Initiate Investigation Under Section 301, 50 Fed. Reg. 40,250 (1985) (section 301 petition filed
Aug. 5, 1985); 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 16 (1986) (U.S. specialty steel producers file section
301 petition on Dec. 18, 1985, against Swedish specialty steel industry). Before September
1985, the self-initiation mechanism had never been utilized. On September 16, 1985, the
USTR self-initiated three section 301 investigations. The first involved Korean insurance industry practices that allegedly restricted the access of American insurance companies to the
Korean insurance market. 2 [Reference File] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1422 (1985). The
USTR self-initiated a second investigation involving Japanese tariffs and distribution restrictions that allegedly acted as barriers to exports of American tobacco products. 2 [Reference
File] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1422 (1985).
On October 16, 1985, the President directed the USTR to self-initiate two section 301
investigations. The first concerned Korean intellectual property rights protection, 2 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1289 (1985). The second was an investigation into the wheat export practices of the European Economic Community (EC). 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1289 (1985).
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President acts on his own motion,180 a section 301 proceeding is usually
initiated by an American industry or trade group that files a petition with
the USTR, which then has forty-five days to decide whether to initiate an
investigation."' The statute does not provide any standards to regulate
the decision to initiate. However, if the USTR decides not to initiate an
investigation, it must notify the petitioner and publish the reasons in the
Federal Register. 8 2 If the USTR decides to initiate an investigation, it
must request consultations with the foreign government involved., 8 3
The statute prescribes deadlines-from seven to twelve months after
initiation of the investigation'g---by which the USTR must recommend
what action, if any, the President should take. The President in turn has
twenty-one days from receipt of the USTR's recommendation to deterBefore the President takes any action,
mine what action he will take.'
the USTR is required to provide an opportunity fbr the expression of
views on the matter.'8 6 Although the petitioner has a vested interest in
the outcome of the investigation and any relief that is ordered,18 7 once
the investigation is initiated the Government controls the proceedings.
The petitioner in effect becomes a third-party beneficiary of any relief
granted under section 301.
The results under section 301 have been mixed. Generally, once a
section 301 petition is filed, the USTR will initiate an investigation. In
only one instance the USTR determined not to initiate an investiga180. Under section 302 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982), the President
may take action under section 301 without a formal investigation by the USTR. In 1986 the
President acted on his own motion in two cases. The first involved the entry of Spain and
Portugal into the EC, see Memorandum of May 15, 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed, Reg. 18,294
(1986). The other concerned Taiwan's customs valuation, see Memorandum of Aug. 1, 1986,
for the United States Trade Representative, Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,219 (1986).
181. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1982); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3 (1985).
182. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1) (1982); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3(a) (1985).
183. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (Supp. III 1985); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.5(a) (1985). A request for
consultations may be delayed for up to 90 days for the purpose of verifying the petition. 19
U.S.C. § 2413(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
184. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1) (1982).
185. Id. § 2411(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
186. Id. § 2414(b) (1982). The USTR may also seek the ITC's advice on the probable
impact on the economy of retaliatory restrictions on foreign imports. Id. § 2414(b)(3).
187. In this connection, the USTR must "seek information and advice from the petitioner
(if any) and the appropriate representatives" from the private sector in preparing for consultations with the foreign government. Id. § 2413(a) (Supp. III 1985); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.5(b)
(1985).
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tion. 88 That petition alleged various barriers to imports of fresh-cut
roses from the United States by several countries.1 89 The USTR gave the
following four reasons for not initiating an investigation:
(1) Several of the alleged unfair practices named in the petition
had been terminated or were found not to exist; (2) several of the practices had already been dealt with in the context of countervailing duty
investigations; (3) many of the allegations of unfair practices were not
sufficiently supported by information in the petition; and (4) the peti-

tion did not, with respect to several allegations, adequately demonstrate the burden to United States commerce or the causal link
between the alleged practice and effect. 190
Although the USTR rarely declines to initiate a section 301 investigation, it has terminated investigations for a variety of reasons. For example, on one occasion 91 the USTR cited the fact that a countervailing
duty case was pending 9 2 as its reason for terminating an investigation;
that is, the allegations made in the section 301 petition (a purported violation of the Subsidies Code by the Canadian Government in the subway
car industry) 9" were already being investigated by the Commerce Department in a pending countervailing duty proceeding.' 94 On the basis of
the fourth factor cited in the Roses case,195 the USTR discontinued an
investigation into allegations that the European Economic Community
(EC) and Japan had engaged in an unfair trade practice by purportedly
agreeing to divert Japanese steel exports to the United States. 96 The

USTR could not find sufficient substantiation for the claim that the ECJapan agreement unfairly burdened United States commerce. 9 7
188. Determination Not to Initiate an Investigation Under Section 301, Roses, Inc., 50
Fed. Reg. 40,250 (1985).
189. Id
190. Id The Federal Register notice added that: "Where the decision not to initiate is
based on the latter two factors, it is without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to re-file
when adequate information is developed." Id
191. 47 Fed. Reg. 42,059 (1982).
192. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,764 (1982).
193. Id.
194. See 47 Fed. Reg. 42,059 (1982). Compare 47 Fed. Reg. 51,717 (1982), in which the

President directed the USTR, in the context of a section 301 investigation, to request the ITC
to expedite a section 201 escape clause investigation involving imports of specialty steel
products.
195. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
196. See 43 Fed. Reg. 3,962 (1978); 41 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1976).
197. 43 Fed. Reg. 3,962 (1978). The foregoing reflects some of the ways section 301 petitions have been disposed of at the preliminary stages. The mere filing of the petition and
initiation of an investigation have often provided the impetus for cessation of the offending
foreign trade practice. See, eg., 45 Fed. Reg. 41,558 (1980) (EC subsidies on malt exports

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. I I

Although the statute directs the President to "take all appropriate

and feasible action"'198 to enforce United States rights or to obtain the
elimination of the foreign restrictions, the President's discretion is virtually unbridled. If the President does take action, lie may impose duties

or other import restrictions;1 99 suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of trade agreement concessions; 211and restrict service

sector access authorization.20 ' When negotiation of a dispute has been
unsuccessful, the President has
sanctions.20 2 Even then, because
the President has reconsidered
tions.2 °3 With few exceptions, a

ordered the imposition of retaliatory
the political stakes are frequently high,
such action pending further negotiasection 301 petitioner has not received

reduced year following filing of section 301 petition). At other times, the President has concluded that practices that are allegedly unfair or unreasonable are neither. Se, e.g., 50 Fed.
Reg. 29,631 (1985) (practices of the member states of the European Space Agency not a viola.
tion of section 301). This section 301 action involved allegations of government inducements
and assistance in the commercial phase of the European Space Agency (ESA). Id In other
words, American practice with NASA was the standard against which the ESA was being
measured. Typically, however, bilateral negotiations are entered into between the United
States and the foreign country involved, with the offending restrictions sometimes being lifted
or substantially modified. See, e.g., 49 Fed. Reg. 10,761 (1984) (Taiwan subsidies on rice exports). In lieu of bilateral negotiations and consultations, formal consultations are sometimes
held under the auspices of GATT. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 1,504 (1979) (GATT panel report
results in discontinuance by EC of minimum import price mechanism for canned fruit juices);
45 Fed. Reg. 51,169 (1980) (GATT Subsidies Code dispute settlement process pursued in connection with EC export subsidies on wheat flour).
The negotiation and consultation process can drag on interminably. For example, a petition filed October 25, 1982, see 47 Fed. Reg. 56,428 (1982), alleging EC Japanese import restrictions on leather footwear was finally resolved through negotiations in December 1985. 3
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 4 (1986). Similarly, resolution of a petition filed October 29, 1981,
alleging that the EC gave unlawful production subsidies to its canned fruit industry, see 46
Fed. Reg. 61,358 (1981), was not resolved until December 1985. Bello & Holmer, Significant
Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, in U.S. TRADE LAW AND POLICY 324-26
(PLI 1987).
198. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (Supp. III 1985).
199. Id. § 241 1(b)(2). The President is empowered to take such action either on a nondiscriminatory basis or solely against the offending foreign government. Id. § 241 1(a)(2)(A).
200. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(b)(1).
201. Id. § 2411(c). The access provision was added by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304(c), 98 Stat. 3002 (1984). Access to the United States service
sector, such as telecommunications, is regulated by the federal government through devices
such as licenses.
202. See, e.g., Increase in the Rates of Duty for Certain Pasta Articles from the European
Economic Community, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,143 (1985) (preferential EC tariffs on citrus products
from the Mediterranean; United States import duties on EC pasta).
203. In connection with the dispute over Mediterranean citrus imports to the EC and the
proposed duty increase on imports of EC pasta to the United States in retaliation, President
Reagan suspended the effective date of the increased duties pending further negotiations,
Modification of the Effective Date for Increased Rates of Duty for Certain Pasta Articles from
the European Economic Community, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,711 (1985). See also Determination
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outright rejection from the USTR. While substantial doubts linger over
whether the relief received under section 301 has been satisfactory to pe-

titioners, 2 4 these doubts may soon vanish in light of the five self-initiated
section 301 cases in 1985 and the two presidential section 301 actions in

1986.
It is highly debatable whether section 301 meets the "intelligible
principle" standard for delegations of legislative authority to the President given the section's sweeping powers. Of course, those powers are
one of the reasons why section 301 is the Reagan administration's "statute of choice." 2 °5
III.

THE EROSION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH
STATUTORY DISCRETION AND THE

RISE OF VRAs
Against the foregoing backdrop, three trends emerged. The first
trend was Congress' attempt to limit broad executive discretion. The
second consisted of resort to pressure group politics by domestic industries. The third involved the re-emergence of broad executive discretion
as a result of increased use of VRAs to resolve international trade
disputes.
The first trend emerged during the 1970s and 1980s when Congress
trimmed back the executive branch's discretionary powers considerably
by enacting the five major trade relief statutes discussed above. It is puzzling why Congress continues to give the exective branch any discretion
under these five trade laws, especially given the absence of any suppoitUnder Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,733 (1984), in which the President postponed taking retaliatory action against Argentina for its restrictive mail courier practices pending further negotiations. A similar eleventh-hour cancellation of planned retaliatory
tariffs occurred in the EC-U.S. dispute over entry of Spain and Portugal to the EC in 1986.
See supra note 19.
204. See, eg., Coffield, supra note 166, at 382-85, in which the author notes that prior to
passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the majority of the section 301 cases were never
satisfactorily resolved from the American point of view. The author further notes:
[N]o section 301 case to date has led to retaliation by the U.S. Government
against the complained of act, practice, or policy of the foreign government. Nor
have several of the cases been resolved successfully or even partially from the point of
view of the petitioner. Many cases with a partial action on the part of the foreign
government, were terminated because of the de minimis nature of the harm suffered,
or were rather unsatisfactorily resolved through the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism.
_Idat 399.
205. See Section 301 Discussion, Export Contrls Delegates' Trade Votes Topics of ABA
Meeting, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1084 (1986).
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ing rationale for such discretionary power. Indeed, congressional delegation of broad discretionary power is contraindicated by the legislative
history of these laws. For example, in a very telling remark, the Senate
Finance Committee Report on section 301 noted that "relief ought not to
be denied for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with the merits of
the case as determined under United States law."' 20 6 This statement
clearly evidences a congressional desire to depoliticize the escape clause
relief decision making process. The tenor of the Senate Finance Committee's Report is that relief should ordinarily be granted following an affirmative ITC determination, with the only question being the form and
amount of such import relief.207 Equally telling in this regard is the further observation by the Senate that "no United States industry which has
suffered serious injury should be cut off from relief for foreign policy
reasons." 20 8 The "for policy reasons" ground for disapproving relief
under section 337209 is puzzling in light of the comments made in the
legislative history to Section 201. Nevertheless, from the standpoint that
the executive branch acts in the international trade field pursuant to a
congressional delegation of power, these five trade laws at least cloak the
executive in a constitutional mantle.
Because of the considerable amount of discretionary power still left
to the executive branch under these five trade laws, a second and more
serious trend has emerged. Although Congress has curbed executive
branch discretion to some extent, petitioning domestic industries continue to be denied trade relief under the statutory mechanisms for securing such relief. This result has at times been attributable to the exercise
of discretionary executive branch power in cases in which American producers and manufacturers had successfully established their entitlement
to relief under the applicable trade statutes. At times this result was simply due to a failure of the petitioner to establish its; entitlement to relief.
Out of frustration with the seemingly arbitrary administrative process, or
maybe out of expediency, American industries have resorted more and
more to pressure-group politics within Congress, which starts the VRA
cycle.
The VRA cycle begins with calls for protectionist trade legislation
by one or more members of Congress who raise the overworked specter
of foreign imports displacing thousands of honest, hard-working Ameri206. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 89, at 205, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7268.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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cans. The odds that this legislation would ever be enacted are at best
remote. The White House, in seeming partnership with these protectionist elements within Congress, responds in knee-jerk fashion by negotiating a VRA in order to stem the protectionist tide. Moreover, the
President could always veto such legislative developments if he was truly
committed to GAT free trade principles. Instead, the White House and
the minority factions on the Hill perform a VRA pas de deux that is as
politically expedient as it is undemocratic.
From this second trend has emerged a third and more dangerous
trend: the ever increasing resort to VRAs by the President to resolve
international trade disputes, which displace the statutory vehicles set up
by Congress for securing trade relief and replacing whatever statutory
discretionary power the executive branch lost during the seventies and
eighties.
IV.

THE CASE AGAINST VRAS

As the preceding discussion has shown, the trade relief process is
not only complex but unpredictable, given the inherent vagaries of executive branch discretionary power. Domestic industries perceive that the
executive branch arbitrarily and capriciously administers United States
trade laws whenever it exercises its prerogatives under these laws to deny
trade relief. Conversely, whenever relief is granted, our foreign trading
partners raise the red flags of protectionism and trade discrimination.
Finally, United States citizens are left with the impression that interest
group politics continue to carry the day.
Given the difficulty, uncertainty, and expense of obtaining relief
under current United States trade legislation--especially under the escape clause and section 301, United States industries with political clout
have resorted to pressuring Congress and the executive branch for protection outside the context of existing trade laws in the form of VRAs.
President Reagan's response has been to succumb to this pressure. For
example, he has negotiated restraints on exports of autos, textiles, and
steel to the United States.210 One of the most disturbing developments is
that American producers and manufacturers may be turning their backs
on the statutory vehicles created by Congress for securing trade relief in
preference for VRAs.2 1
210. See G. HUFBAUER, D. BERLINER & K. ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 117-84, 249-62.
211. See, eg., Administration to Seek VRA with Sweden, Specialty Steel Producers Withdraw Petition, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 403-04 (1986):

As a result of this initiative, U.S. specialty steel producers have withdrawn without prejudice their section 301 petition that charged that Stockholm was heavily sub-
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One response within Congress has been the introduction of trade
legislation that eliminates or substantially curtails executive branch discretion to deny trade relief under sections 201 and 301.2 Another response has been to introduce protectionist measures to reduce the large
trade deficits the United States has with some of its major trading partners. 21 3 By amending sections 201, 301, 337, and the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws to eliminate or at least substantially curtail the
discretionary power of the executive branch to grant or withhold relief,
Congress would be taking a major step toward restoring predictability to
the administrative process and bringing greater coherence to United
States trade policy. The elimination of most executive branch discretionary powers contained in these laws would be in the best interests of representative democracy, for the simple reason that public confidence in
them as meaningful tools for obtaining trade relief' would be enhanced.
A failure by Congress to amend the trade laws to reduce executive
discretion, and to resort to protectionist trade measures instead, ironically may lead to further VRAs. The mere threat of passage of such
protectionist legislation will result in the negotiation of VRAs by the
President with exporting countries in order to stem perceived protectionism. A classic example of just such a development is the VRA on
automobiles negotiated between the United States and Japan in 1981.
On June 12, 1980, the United Automobile Workers, joined by Ford
Motor Company, filed a section 201 petition with the ITC, alleging that
foreign imports were seriously injuring the domestic passenger automobile and truck industry. 2 14 The ITC determined by a three-to-two vote

that the passenger automobile and lightweight truck industries were not
being seriously injured as a result of imports.2 1 5 A majority of the Commission found the decline in demand for new automobiles and lightweight trucks to be attributable to general recessionary conditions in the
sidizing the Swedish industry. However, attorneys for the U.S. producers warned
that if the negotiations fail, they will reserve the right to bring new actions under the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws and under section 301.
Id. See also Industry Leaders Urge Administration to Take Tougher Imports Stance, Call/or
More VRAs, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 461-62 (1986); More Voluntary RestraintAgreements
Said Solution to U.S. Trade Imbalance, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 490-92 (1987).
212. See, eg., Senate Omnibus Trade Act of 1987, S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987),
H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). See also Yeutter Opposed to Senate Omnibus Trade
Bill, Offers Point-By-Point Criticism, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 475 (1987).
213. See Yeutter Opposed to Senate Omnibus Trade Bill, Offers Point-By-Point Criticism,
supra note 213, at 475.
214. See Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor, USITC Pub.
1110, Inv. No. TA-201-44 (1980).
215. Id. at 34-35.
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United States, as well as to a shift in consumer tastes to smaller, more
fuel-efficient models.2 16
Following the Commission's decision, the auto industry unsuccessfully pressured the Carter administration for import restrictions on foreign automobiles.21 7 Undaunted, the automobile industry was successful
in getting Senators Danforth and Bentsen to introduce legislation in February 1981 to limit auto exports from Japan to 1.6 million units per year
for the three-year period beginning in 1981.218 On May 2, 1981, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry announced that it
had reached a VRA with the Reagan administration under which the
Japanese would reduce automobile exports to the United States for a oneyear period to 1.68 million units, a reduction of 7.7 percent from the
1980 level of 1.82 million units.2" 9 This VRA was renewed for a second,
third, and fourth year (with a slight ceiling increase in the fourth
year),2 20 in the face of threats from Congress to pass legislation limiting
automobile imports.2 2 1 In March 1985, President Reagan decided not to
ask the Japanese to renew the automobile VRA for a fifth year. Nevertheless, in the face of continuing pressure from Congress to enact some
form of protectionist legislation, Japan announced that it would limit automobile exports to the United States to 2.3 million units in 1 9 8 5 .,
As the automobile case illustrates, VRAs pose a serious threat to
representative democracy. Protection was provided for the automobile
industry, but not in the constitutionally prescribed manner. The appropriate vehicle for obtaining relief in the automobile case was the section
201 escape clause. When relief was not forthcoming, the petitioners' recourse at that point should have been clear: a petition to Congress for a
change in the law. Instead, they petitioned the President, who was more
than willing to oblige with an incredibly costly VRA. There was no public discussion within Congress of the costs of the automobile VRA, no
216. Idt at 35.
217. Instead, the administration authorized trade adjustment assistance benefits. See G.
HUFBAUER, D. BERLINER & K. ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 250.

218. S. 396, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
219. G. HUFBAUER, D. BERLINER & K. ELLIOtT, supra note 2, at 250.

220. Id at 251. The export limit was raised from 1.68 million to 1.85 million automobiles
during the period from April 1, 1984, to March 31, 1985. Id.

221. On February 2, 1983, Representative Richard Ottinger introduced domestic content
legislation, entitled the Fair Practices in Automotive Products Act, H.R. 1234, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983). On February 12, 1983, Japan renewed the automobile VRA at existing levels.

On November 3, 1983, the House passed H.R. 1234 by a 20-vote margin. The Senate took no
action on its counterpart bill prior to adjournment. G. HUFBAUER, D. BERLINER & K. ELLIOTr, supra note 2, at 251.
222. G. HUFBAUER, D. BERLINER & K. ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 251.

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. I I

majority vote on the propriety of such protectionism, and no supervision
by Congress of the President in an area where Congress possesses plenary
constitutional power. The automobile VRA effectively cut off all discussion of the issue.
Arguably, that is what Congress wanted. Congress in the main has
abdicated responsibility for supervising the executive's conduct in the international trade field as it relates to VRAs, knowing that the institutional costs of policing the White House are high. Decisions are made
expeditiously without the annoyance, and the possible embarrassment, of
public debate.
By contrast, if higher tariffs had been imposed on imported
automobiles, they would have been discussed, debated, and enacted by
Congress-the constitutionally prescribed manner for regulating international trade. Tariffs have a high political profile. A consumer knows the
effect a ten percent duty has on the price of an imported item. Tariffs
also allow market forces to continue to operate, provided they are not
prohibitively high, because a foreign competitor can adjust its costs in
order to absorb the tariff and still penetrate the United States market.
VRAs, on the other hand, are embraced because they have such low
economic visibility. Regardless of a foreign firm's efficiency, additional
units of a foreign firm's product are barred from entry into the United
States once the quota ceiling is reached. This artificial scarcity in turn
leads to higher prices. But because the high costs of VRAs are not publicly debated or discussed within Congress, they do not have high political visibility.
This feature encourages Congress to avoid the politically painful
task of enacting limits on the export of certain goods to the United
States. Congress, instead, has been more than happy to let the President
play the heavy, knowing full well the likely response were the average
voter to learn that (1) the cost to consumers of the VRA for the domestic
automobile industry was $5.8 billion in 1984 alone; 2 '3 (2) the cost to consumers of each automobile worker job saved in 1984 was $105,000 (in an
industry in which the workers earn far more than the average American
consumer of automobiles); 224 (3) the cost to consumers of VRAs negotiated on behalf bf the steel industry was $6.8 billion in 1984;225 and (4) the
cost to consumers of each steelworker's job saved was $750,000 in
223. Francis, The High Cost of Protectionism and What Can Be Done About It, Christian
Sci. Monitor, Mar. 20, 1986, at 23, col. 1.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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1984.226

If Congress performed its constitutionally designated role, it would
publicly air the economic costs of such protectionism and, more importantly, halt executive branch subversion of the constitutionally created
process for setting trade policy. In addition, the unquestionable inconsistency of VRAs with our international obligations under the GATT
would be publicly discussed.2 27 From all of this, a coherent trade policy
might emerge to replace the present fragmented, ad hoe system. 2 2 It
would also restore Congress' power to regulate international trade, which
is its exclusive constitutional preserve.
Can VRAs be outlawed? Despite disingenuous decisions such as
Consumers Union of U.S., Ina v. Kissinger,2 2 9 in which the District of
Columbia Circuit concluded that a steel VRA between the United States
and Japan was not an enforceable import restriction because it was
purely "voluntary," Congress could pursue several tacks in dealing with
the VRA threat. First, in recognition of the insidious effect VRAs have
on the constitutionally mandated process for regulating international
trade, Congress should prohibit the President from accepting, negotiating, or concluding VRAs unless specifically authorized by statute to do
so.2"' That Congress has the political will to enact such legislation is
illustrated by the Steel Stabilization Act of 1984.21 In 1984 the ITC
reached affirmative section 201 escape clause determinations regarding
some products on behalf of the domestic carbon steel industry in Carbon
and Certain Alloy Steel Products.2 32 Although President Reagan formally denied the industry relief, he did promise to negotiate steel VRAs
with several of the major steel-producing countries.2 33 By the end of
226. Id.
227. VRAs are a major departure from GATT's article I most-favored-nation principle,
Le., that trade restrictions apply equally to imports from whatever source. VRAs are also a
direct violation of GATI's article XI prohibition against import quotas. In addition, because
VRAs are purportedly voluntary, no compensation is required under GATT article XIX. See
generally J. JACKSON, supra note 37, at 255, 305, 564.
228. See J. TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 40-43

(1985).
229. 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). See Note, PresidentialAuthority to Negotiate Voluntary Export RestraintArrangenzents with Foreign Producers,7
LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 905 (1975).

230. One such statutory authorization is found in section 201, which permits the President
to negotiate orderly marketing arrangements, a euphemism for VRAs. See supra note 126 and
accompanying text.
231. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
232. USITC Pub. 1553, Inv. No. TA-201-51 (1984).
233. The Shrinking of the Steel Industry, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, § 3, at 4, col. 2;
Reagan Crafts Sugar-CoatedProtectionism, Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1984, § G, at 1, col. 6.
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1984, VRAs had been negotiated with seven countries.2 34 In an apparent
fit of pique at the domestic steel industry's seeming unwillingness to adjust, 235 as well as anger at the steel industry's purchase of nonsteel-related companies (such as oil companies),2 36 Congress enacted title VII of
the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.237 Title VII requires as a condition for
retaining the authority to enforce these VRAs that the President certify
annually that the domestic steel industry "taken as a whole" has reinvested "substantially all of its net cash flow" to modernize its carbon and
alloy steel facilities.238 If Congress could act against VRAs negotiated on
behalf of the steel industry, then it should be capable of taking the next
step by outlawing VRAs across the board.
On a less ambitious power-of-the-purse tack, commentators have
suggested that Congress withhold appropriation of all funds to the Customs Service for monitoring compliance with any VRA.2 39 It has also
been proposed that the Sherman Act be amended to make it an antitrust
violation for foreign producers to form a cartel in order to comply with a
VRA.2 4° Even if such cartels were formed because they were mandated
by the foreign producers' government, the defense of sovereign compulsion would no longer be available to those producers under this
proposal.2 41
Perhaps the most potent reform proposal of all, but admittedly the
most problematic to enact, would be the elimination of all executive
branch discretion to withhold or deny trade relief under the five major
trade relief laws. The benefit of such legislation vis-A-vis VRAs would be
a salutary one. By insuring statutorily mandated relief to a domestic
party that establishes its case for relief under these laws, the incentive to
seek discretionary relief under a VRA would be diminished if not altogether eliminated. Once a petitioner has established its case for trade
relief, the relief should not only be mandatory, but its form should be
spelled out with specificity and entrusted to an appropriate (and in234. The seven countries were Japan, Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Spain, Australia, and South
Africa, collectively representing 30% of the U.S. steel import market in 1984. R. LAWRENCE
& R. LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE 90 n.39 (1986). See generally Wetter, TradePolicy Developments in the Steel Sector, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 485 (1985).
235. The carbon steel industry has been the beneficiary of some form of protectionism since
1969. See G. HUFBAUER, D. BERLINER & K. ELLIOTT, supra note 2, at 154-84.
236. See id. at 174.
237. See supra note 232.
238. The President is required to make this finding for each of the major American steel
producers. See H.R. REP. No. 1089, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984).
239. See R. LAWRENCE & R. LITAN, supra note 235, at 101-02.
240. Id. at 102.
241. Id.; T. TUMLIR, supra note 229, at 48-50.
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dependent) administrative agency, such as the International Trade Commission, to administer. Furthermore, legislation should afford judicial
review to insure that any determination or relief decision is made in a
rational manner.
If domestic manufacturers were aware that their meritorious petitions would bring them the relief provided by existing United States
trade legislation, the alarming trend of greater resort to VRAs might be
halted. Whether the same would be true for domestic industries that
were unsuccessful at the administrative level on the merits of their petitions-such as the automobile industry in its 1980 section 201 petitionwould depend in part on the availability of judicial review. If an unsuccessful petitioner had recourse to the courts, this would serve to insure
that the loser at the administrative level had not been the victim of arbitrary or capricious agency action. If a thorough administrative and judicial review process is afforded and American producers and
manufacturers still consider themselves losers under United States trade
laws, perhaps they need to rely less on waging losing legal battles and
instead concentrate their energies on becoming world-class economic
competitors.
Proposals for more aggressive, less discretionary trade laws may fail
to take into account the long-term foreign policy fallout from such legislation. If ultimately enacted, such proposals may result in increased friction between the United States and its trading partners, possibly
triggering a trade war. Must the trade-off for more representative democracy in the international trade process mean little or no executive
branch discretion in that process? The answer must be an unqualified
"yes" when one considers that the aftermath of VRAs has been an electorate blissfully ignorant of the insidious effect VRAs have had on the
democratic political process and the United States economy. VRAs are a
blatant circumvention of political discussion. VRAs are extremely expensive and represent a hidden tax on every American consumer. A coherent foreign trade policy can emerge only from broad congressional
discussion. Having flexibility to resolve trade disputes is unquestionably
desirable, but not in a representative democracy when the results are
quantitative restraints on exports, "voluntarily" negotiated government
to government in response to a hollow threat from a few within Congress
to legislate higher restraint levels. A coherent foreign trade policy can
take shape only when all of the constitutionally designated actors in formulating that policy-Congress and the President-have given meaningful input. The empty threats from a handful of members of Congress to
push through protectionist trade legislation does not constitute a political
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discussion at an appropriate level. In short, international trade policy is
a zero-sum game in which increased executive branch discretion to shape
and effect trade policy necessarily means a decline in representative
democracy.
CONCLUSION
Economic foreign policy requires long-term consideration. The
hallmarks of a sound economic foreign policy are continuity and stability, not short-term considerations of domestic expediency. Voluntary
trade restraint agreements are short sighted, insidiously erode the integrity of national law in Western democracies, and permit discrete legislative minorities to obtain political results that a legislative majority is
publicly unwilling to support. At least one solution to this problem is the
elimination of the Executive's prerogative to enter into voluntary restraint agreements. While a reaffirmation of the GATT article I unconditional most-favored-nation principle would be a symbolic first step, the
only legally effective curb to trade discrimination will be abolition of executive branch discretionary power to conclude VRAs. Threats from
segments of Congress to enact protective trade legislation will not cease,
but passage of such legislation will be far less frequent than VRAs. More
importantly, if such protectionist trade legislation is enacted, it will at
least be a reflection of democratic choice, not executive prerogative initiated by pressure group logrolling. Voluntary restraint agreements
should be prohibited not only because they hinder the formulation of a
coherent economic foreign policy, but also because they put representative democracy at risk.

